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It is often argued that “new economy” jobs are less likely to use traditional employment
relationships, and more likely to rely on “alternative” or “contingent” work.  When we look at new
economy jobs classified on the basis of employment in high-tech industries, we do not find greater use
of contingent or alternative employment relationships.  However, when we classify new economy workers
based on residence in high-tech cities, contingent and alternative employment relationships are more
common, even after accounting for the faster employment growth in these cities.  Finally, defining “new
economy” more literally to be those industries with the fastest growth yields the most striking differences,
as workers in the fastest-growing industries are much more likely to be in contingent or alternative
employment relationships, with a large share of this difference driven by employment in the fast-growing
construction and personnel supply services industries where employment is perhaps “intrinsically”
contingent or alternative.  While subject to numerous qualifications, the combined evidence gives some
support to the hypothesis that the new economy may entail a possibly significant and long-lasting increase
in contingent and alternative employment relationships.
David Neumark Deborah Reed
Department of Economics Public Policy Institute of California
Michigan State University 500 Washington Street, Suite 800




While many commentators have tried to define the “new economy,” researchers have only recently 
begun to grapple with defining the new economy, exploring its consequences, and testing hypotheses 
regarding what makes the new economy “new.”  In our view, one important set of hypotheses regards 
consequences for the nature of the employment relationship.  In particular, it is often argued that new 
economy jobs are less likely to use traditional employment relationships, and more likely to rely on 
“alternative” or “contingent” work.  The goal of this paper is to explore evidence on whether the new 
economy is indeed associated with less-traditional employment relationships.   
  The “new economy” means many things to many people, although all emphasize to some extent 
the role of information technology and the information sector of the economy.
1  One set of definitions 
refers broadly to an economy that operates differently from the past in some fundamental way.  Thus, to 
some investors the “new economy” means (or meant) a world in which stock market valuations do not 
depend in the usual ways on earnings and other fundamentals, a view spurred in particular by the financial 
performance of information technology companies (at least prior to the recent sharp declines in the 
NASDAQ).
2  To Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, it apparently refers to productivity gains 
driven by information technology that allow (or allowed) the economy to grow at a fast pace without 
igniting inflation.
3  An alternative macroeconomic perspective is that information technology has reduced 
the component of the business cycle driven by inventory fluctuations.
4  To businesspeople, it may mean a 
world that rewards innovation and new concepts more than machinery and production,
5 as well as an 
increasingly globalized marketplace.
6  These “aggregate” definitions of the new economy have been the 
                                                 
1 See DeLong and Summers (2001) for a review of many “views” of the new economy.  To emphasize the dramatic 
role of information technology, they suggest that the past 40 years have witnessed a four-billion-fold increase in the 
world’s raw computational power (p. 17).   
2 See D’Andrea Tyson (2001).  For evidence on this hypothesis, see Bond and Cummins (2000). 
3 See Miller (2001).  For evidence on this hypothesis, see Gordon (2000) and Black and Lynch (2000). 
4 See DeLong and Summers (2001).   
5 See Encyclopedia of the New Economy (hotwired.lycos.com/special/ene/). 
6 See Shepard (1997). 2 
dominant foci in writing on the new economy in the popular media, most likely because the discussion 
occurred largely in the context of rather striking macroeconomic and financial-market developments.     
However, a second set of definitions of the new economy–more germane to this paper–focuses 
more on the world of work, arguing that new types of jobs are emerging that may share some common 
features, and are different from the old.
7  Frequently the identification of such jobs is tied to the broader 
definitions of the new economy mentioned above.  For example, the sectors thought to be fueling 
productivity gains–such as software, financial services, media, and consulting–are sometimes viewed as 
new economy industries.
8  Reich (2001) focuses on the increasing demand in the new economy for creative 
and innovative talent as opposed to the talent to bring products to the market.  Finally, a more “mechanical” 
definition of new economy jobs is simply those that are growing the fastest; assuming this faster growth 
continues, such jobs will clearly represent a larger share of whatever new economy emerges.
9 
Definitions of the new economy based on the world of work naturally raise questions about 
whether jobs in the new economy are different from jobs in the old economy, and what the implications of 
these differences are for workers, firms, and labor market institutions and policies.  In particular, there are 
at least three reasons to believe the development of the new economy may foretell changes in the 
employment relationship.  First, an extensive literature has recently developed documenting changes in the 
employment relationship in the United States in the latter part of the 1990s.  This literature generally did 
not establish dramatic and fundamental changes in the employment relationship, giving lie to assertions that 
long-term jobs were disappearing.  It did, though, appear to establish two results.  First, workers who had 
previously experienced among the most stable and secure jobs–most notably, perhaps, more-educated and 
older workers in managerial and professional occupations–had begun in the 1990s to experience decreased 
job stability and job security.
10  Second, although comparable data over time are hard to come by, it is fairly 
                                                 
7 There are also other microeconomic characterizations of the new economy that do not focus so much on the world of 
work, emphasizing the non-rival nature of information-related goods (DeLong and Summers, 2001), and different cost 
structures in new economy industries, in particular high fixed costs and low variable costs (Varian, 2001).   
8 See Mandel (1999). 
9 See U.S. Department of Commerce (2000). 
10 See, e.g., Neumark, et al. (1999) and Valletta (1999).  3 
clear that there has been growth over the 1990s in workers employed in flexible staffing arrangements.
11  
The simple coincidence of the timing of changes in the employment relationship and the apparent 
emergence of the new economy naturally raises the question of the link between the new economy and the 
employment relationship.    
  The second reason to examine whether and how the new economy impacts the employment 
relationship is that some of the technological changes that are conjectured to underlie high productivity 
growth are likely to influence the labor market.  One potential channel of influence includes the 
hypothesized link between the growth of computer use in the workplace and increases in the demand for 
more-educated workers.
12  A second, more directly tied to the employment relationship, concerns the role 
of technology in general, and information technology in particular, in changing the organization of work 
and production systems and sometimes the nature of the goods or services produced.
13   
The third motivation for investigating the link between the new economy and the employment 
relationship is simply the popular view that the advent of the new economy threatens traditional 
employment relationships.  Commentators from a variety of quarters often describe new economy jobs as 
inherently unstable, and relying on non-traditional or “contingent” forms of employment.  A few examples 
follow: 
 
• “In the new economy, the employer/employee employment relationship has been turned upside 
down.  Employees no longer stay with a single company for their entire career…A key to 
guaranteeing employment and income security for new economy employees is to ensure that they 
are equipped with the skill base to easily move from one job to the next…Companies are shifting to 
                                                 
11 See Houseman and Polivka (2000), who cite evidence from the Upjohn Institute Employer Survey on Flexible 
Staffing Arrangements, and discuss other evidence.   
12 See, e.g., Autor, et al. (1998).   
13 See, e.g., Batt (1999), Bresnahan, et al. (1999) and work reviewed therein, and earlier related work on the 
implications of the rise of “technicians” for the organization of work, described in Barley (1996).   4 
a smaller core workforce, which is supplemented with a contingent workforce that has the skills 
needed at the moment.”
14   
 
• “There is nothing inevitable or preordained that requires New Economy jobs to be cheap-wage, 




• “Many new economy jobs hire contractors, not employees.  The theory is that they will bring you 
on, give you no benefits, pay you for the project they hire you for, and then let you go.”
16 
 
This paper addresses the hypothesis embodied in the above quotes–that the new economy 
challenges and changes the nature of the employment relationship, reducing reliance on “traditional” 
employment, and increasing the use of “contingent” or “alternative” work arrangements (including but not 
limited to use of contractors).  While conjectures about the impact of the new economy on the employment 
relationship abound, we are aware of no evidence based on representative samples of workers on which 
these conjectures are based.   
The fundamental difficulty in an empirical analysis of this question is operationalizing the phrase 
“new economy.”  As explained above, the phrase has many meanings, and only a subset of them–in 
particular, those that define the new economy based on jobs–point to direct links between the new economy 
and the employment relationship, and lead to feasible strategies for exploring these links by distinguishing 
between “new economy” and “traditional economy” jobs.  Even then, these latter definitions provide 
relatively little guidance in identifying jobs that characterize the new economy.  Thus, a major substantive 
concern in this paper is trying to identify such jobs.   
                                                 
14 Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD (2001). 
15 Bahr (2000).   
16 Triplett (2000). 5 
Information on the nature of the employment relationship is more readily available.  In particular, 
the Current Population Survey (CPS) Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements Supplements 
(often referred to as the Contingent Work Supplements, or CWS) elicit information on workers describing 
the nature of their employment relationship in considerable detail.  Thus, after specifying a number of 
reasonable ways of defining new economy jobs, the nature of the employment relationship in these and 
other jobs is compared using the CWS data.   
II. Identifying New Economy Workers 
  Because we are studying the link between the new economy and the employment relationship, our 
attempts to identify new economy workers rely on those perspectives that most closely tie the definitions of 
the new economy to the types of jobs people do.  However, we want to emphasize two important 
qualifications.  First, even among this limited set of perspectives on the new economy, definitions are 
frustratingly vague.  Thus, while we have chosen some methods of identifying new economy workers that 
seem to be consistent with both some of the commentary about the new economy and common sense, we 
by no means intend to claim that our methods are definitive.  Rather, we hope to “get the ball rolling” with 
regard to research on this question, using some plausible and sensible classification schemes that may also 
motivate other researchers to think about and propose alternatives.   
Second, if the new economy is more appropriately defined along dimensions other than the jobs 
people do, then our classification–by dividing workers into groups that do not correspond to the real 
distinction–may come up with little difference between new economy and other workers, when in fact the 
differences exist.  As an example, if the new economy is defined primarily by how work is organized, and 
the distribution of new economy “workplaces” has little to do with the ways we usually define the jobs 
people do, we may end up looking at a classification of workers that has little to do with new economy 
versus traditional economy jobs, and hence incorrectly conclude that new economy jobs are not 
characterized by different employment relationships.  Similarly, but farther afield, if the new economy is 
defined as a world in which investors look at factors other than economic fundamentals in deciding upon 
the allocation of financial capital, there is no necessary link to job-based distinctions among workers.  On 6 
the other hand, by using a multiplicity of definitions of new economy workers, we may nonetheless manage 
to pick up some of these distinctions.  As an example, a definition based on industries with the fastest 
growth may capture those industries to which capital is flowing, and a definition based on high-tech 
employment may highlight those industries in which technology-driven transformation of the workplace is 
more prevalent.  With these qualifications stated, the remainder of this section describes the methods we 
use to classify new economy workers.  
High-Technology Industries 
Our first classification of new economy workers is based on employment in high-tech industries.  
One common focus in discussions of the new economy is the emphasis on technology and knowledge in the 
workplace.  To some extent, the focus is on work in the information technology sector.
17  More generally, 
though, this perspective focuses on work that relies heavily on technology and that rewards knowledge and 
innovation more than production.
18  Thus, the first approach we use to classifying new economy workers is 
one based on employment in what might be considered “new economy industries,” based on heavy reliance 
upon technological and scientific personnel.   
To avoid picking and choosing industries in a subjective manner that might influence the results, 
we use a Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) study (Hecker, 1999) that seeks to identify “high-technology 
industries.”  The BLS study uses a definition of high-tech industries based on employment of workers in 
two categories: technology-related occupations, and research and development.
19  Industries are then 
classified as high-tech if the proportion of employment in both of these categories is at least twice the 
average for all industries.  This yields a list of 25 Census industries, which are displayed in Table 1.  It 
                                                 
17 As an example, the strike at Verizon by the Communications Workers of America was billed by some as the first 
major battle between unions and the new economy (Boslett, 2000).  See also the comments of Paul David in Schiffrin 
(2000).   
18 See, e.g., Reich (2001), and the assertion in the Encyclopedia of the New Economy (hotwired.lycos.com) that, 
“When we talk about the new economy, we’re talking about a world in which people work with their brains instead of 
their hands.” 
19 The occupational information comes from the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) Surveys covering 1993, 
1994, and 1995.  The technology-related occupations include: engineers; life and physical scientists; mathematical 
specialists; engineering and science technicians; computer specialists; and engineering, scientific, and computer 
managers.  Research and development workers in the OES are identified in these occupations, as well as a variety of 
others (see Hecker, 1999, p. 19).  7 
includes many industries readily recognizable as high-tech–such as computers and related equipment, and 
scientific and controlling instruments.  But it also includes some industries–such as plastics, synthetics, and 
resins, as well as paints, varnishes, and related products–not commonly thought of as high-tech, but which 
nonetheless use a fair amount of scientific personnel.
20   
An important point that Hecker makes is that the classification of high-tech industries he uses is 
relatively robust.  In particular, he provides a comparison of the industries chosen by his criteria with those 
chosen in two earlier BLS reports, and notes the substantial overlap.  This implies that the results we obtain 
using the industry list in this 1999 BLS report are unlikely to reflect idiosyncratic features of this particular 
list.  Indeed, the study also provides a comparison to lists of high-tech industries from non-BLS studies, 
and these too have substantial overlap with the 1999 BLS report, although they tend to be narrower.  Thus, 
there is reason to believe that most reasonable lists of high-tech industries would coincide relatively closely 
with the ones on which we base our analysis.  
Among the high-technology industries, there are seven that can be classified as information-
technology industries according to the U.S. Department of Commerce (1999).  These seven are indicated in 
the second column of Table 1.  We also investigate contingent and alternative employment based on this 
more restricted definition of information-technology industries. 
High-Technology Cities 
  Our second method of classifying new economy workers relies more on geography, classifying 
workers based on employment in cities with high concentrations of high-tech employment.  A definition of 
new economy workers based solely on employment in industries employing a disproportionately high 
number of technological or scientific personnel may miss two important dimensions of new economy jobs.  
First, some jobs or industries associated with the new economy may rely heavily on computers and 
software, but not in a technological capacity.  Second, there may be jobs that “grow up” around the high-
tech sector that are not intensive users of scientific or technological personnel.  An example that might fit 
                                                 
20 Hecker defines a narrower list of “high-technology intensive industries,” covering 9 SIC industries that are arguably 
more closely tied to traditional definitions of high-tech.  However, a number of these industries are combined with 
industries not in this subset in going from SIC to Census industries.  8 
both of these descriptions is employment in dot-com companies involved in a variety of service provision 
businesses–jobs that may capture the innovative and knowledge-based nature of new economy jobs, yet not 
have a strong scientific or technical component, or at least not be classified as scientific or technical 
occupations.  Alternatively, in an effort to be flexible, dynamic, and focused, high-tech start-ups may be 
more likely than traditional companies to use personnel supply services for out-sourcing non-technical 
positions such as janitorial and clerical support.  In such a case we would expect to see more contingent and 
alternative work in high-tech cities but not necessarily among workers in high-tech jobs. 
To try to classify workers in a manner that moves away from purely industry-based measures, but 
captures workers in high-tech industries as well as the jobs that cluster around them geographically, our 
second classification of new economy workers is based on those employed in cities categorized as “high-
tech.”  Use of this label for cities has become commonplace–applied to places like Silicon Valley, Seattle, 
Boston, etc.–with these cities typically viewed as the centers of the new economy.
21  By looking at all 
workers in high-tech cities, we should capture relatively more people in jobs in high-tech industries and 
occupations, as well as those in the industries and occupations that tend to exist or arise in proximity to 
clusters of high-tech employment.   
Again, to avoid making subjective selections of cities that might influence our results, we sought a 
list of high-tech cities from an external research source.  In fact, paralleling to some extent the lists of high-
tech industries that researchers have compiled, a few research institutes have recently tried to come up with 
lists of high-tech cities.  We chose to rely on a Brookings Institution study (Cortright and Mayer, 2001).  
This study begins with a list of 14 high-tech cities that, according to the authors, are those “most frequently 
mentioned in the popular literature” (p. 9).  It then ranks these cities based on relative employment in the 
following industries–computer and electronic product manufacturing, software publishers, information 
services and data processing services, and computer systems design and related services
22–and provides an 
                                                 
21 See, e.g., Paton (1999) and Sunnucks (2001). 
22 These industries are based on the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS).   9 
overall ranking based on relative employment in these industries.  The top 10 cities based on this overall 
ranking, on which we focus our analysis, are displayed in the first column of Table 2.
23   
By way of contrast, a recent study by the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI, 2001) uses a wide 
variety of indicators to identify high-tech cities.  Most of them are not based on employment (and when 
they are, factors like educational level are used, rather than working in the high-tech sector), and quite a 
few of the indicators relate to technology directly (such as domain-name registrations, computers in 
schools, broadband providers, etc.).  However, like with the BLS industry classification discussed above, 
alternative methods of classifying cities come up with quite similar lists.  In particular, 7 of the top 10 cities 
in the Brookings ranking are also in the top 10 cities in the PPI ranking, and the remaining 3 cities in the 
Brookings top 10 are ranked 11, 15, and 16 in the PPI ranking.
24  Conversely, the 3 cities in the PPI top 10 
not included in the Brookings top 10 are included in the original list of 14 cities with which the Brookings 
study begins.
25,26     
Finally, while the motivation for looking at high-tech cities is to capture jobs related to high-tech 
industries although not necessarily in these industries, the list of high-tech cities tends, not surprisingly 
given the way the list was selected, to include cities with large shares of high-tech workers.  This is 
illustrated in the second column of Table 2, which shows the share of each city’s employment in the new 
economy industries based on high-tech employment (from Table 1), computed from CPS data.
27  These 
range from a high of 36 percent in San Jose, to a low of 11 percent in Phoenix.  By way of comparison, the 
                                                 
23 Given that the original universe of 14 cities was not chosen based on a systematic data analysis, we thought it 
preferable to take a subset of these 14 that actually ranked highest on an objective measure.   
24 These three cities are, respectively, Atlanta, Portland, and Phoenix.  The Brookings study looks at the San Jose 
Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area (PMSA), which does not include San Francisco, whereas the PPI study uses an 
area that combines San Jose and San Francisco (using Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas).  In doing these 
comparisons between the two lists of cities, we have treated these as the same areas.      
25 These are Raleigh-Durham, Washington, and Salt Lake City.   
26 Another study of high-tech cities, from the Milken Institute (DeVol, 1999), is based on high-tech industry output (as 
a share).  However, this study includes many very small cities, such as Lubbock, TX, Pocatello, ID, and Atlantic-Cape 
May, NJ.  As these cities are too small to study reliably with the CPS data, this classification of cities is somewhat less 
useful.  Nonetheless, 11 of the 14 cities in the original Brookings list are in the top 50 cities reported in the Milken 
study. 
27 In this and all subsequent CPS calculations, observations are dropped if allocated data were needed to identify a 
worker’s industry.  City codes were not allocated.  City codes were not included in 1995 CWS and we therefore 
exclude 1995 data from the analysis of high-tech cities.  We verified that excluding 1995 from our other analyses does 
not qualitatively affect the main results (reported in Tables 6 and 8). 10 
last row presents the share for other comparable cities not on the list,
28 which is just over 10 percent.  For 
the other high-tech cities, high-tech employment is over-represented by a ratio of about 1.3 to 2.   
High-Growth Industries 
Finally, we use a classification of new economy workers based on employment in the fastest-
growing industries.  The fastest-growing industries, whether or not they have a strong technological basis, 
are destined to be a growing part of the economy, and thus in a mechanical sense–as long as their higher 
growth rates persist–are destined to be increasingly important in the new economy.  It would not be entirely 
surprising, of course, if some of the industries chosen on the basis of high-tech employment are also among 
the fastest-growing industries, since the equating of “high-tech employment” and “new economy” in the 
popular view is no doubt linked in part to the growth of the former.  But other factors such as changing 
demographic structure and changing levels and distribution of income may also–via demand shifts–impact 
which jobs are becoming more prevalent in the economy.   
  To identify the fastest-growing industries, we used CPS Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) files to 
measure employment growth by Census industry from 1996 to 2000.  Growth was calculated as the change 
in the industry’s employment share from 1996 to 2000.  To avoid outliers caused by inaccurate 
measurements, only industries with an employment share of at least .25 percent in 2000 were considered.  
Among these, we took the 20 industries with the highest growth.
29  These are listed in Table 3.   
Three industries chosen on this criterion overlap with new economy industries based on high-tech 
employment, with computer and data processing services first on the list.  But none of the other 22 high-
tech industries are among the 20 fastest-growing industries, and indeed quite a few industries with little 
obvious relationship to high-tech employment or technology more generally appear, including: 
construction, elementary and secondary schools; child day care services; offices and clinics of physicians; 
                                                 
28 This consists of 51 non-high-tech cities that have a minimum of about 500,000 workers.  This cutoff was chosen to 
include cities as small as the smallest city in the list in Table 2 (Austin, with just over 570,000 workers), thus enabling 
a comparison of cities in similar size ranges.   
29 The choice of a cut-off of 20 for the growth classification was arbitrary.  We also looked at results using a cut-off of 
10 (matching the number of high-tech cities) and 25 (matching the number of high-tech industries).  The differences 
between high-growth industries and other industries reported below were qualitatively similarly based on any of these 
cut-offs. 11 
etc.  At the same time, quite a few industries that might be associated with a growing emphasis on 
information or information technology also appear, including: credit agencies, n.e.c.; security, commodity 
brokerage, and investment companies; and telephone communications.   
If we had to categorize the high-growth industries generally, however, perhaps their most striking 
feature is their concentration in services.  Of the 20 industries, 5 of the top 10 and 9 of the top 20 are in 
service industries, defined to include business services, personal services, or professional and related 
services.  Thus, defining new economy industries based on growth rather than high-tech employment 
generates a list of industries overrepresented by the “service economy.”  This is of interest because–
although it may have preceded the emphasis on the new economy in the popular media–frequent reference 
has been made to the transition of the U.S. economy (and other developed economies) into service-oriented 
economies (e.g., Albrecht and Zemke, 1985; Giarini, 1987; Inman, 1985; Ginzberg, 1984).  Thus, workers 
in industries selected on the basis of growth may highlight an older definition of the new economy, based 
on services.  
One noteworthy industry that shows up on the list of fast-growing industries is personnel supply 
services.  This industry has been cited in prior work as one of the fastest-growing industries and the 
industry at the forefront of the growth in contingent and alternative work arrangements (Houseman and 
Polivka, 2000; Segal and Sullivan, 1997).
30  This is a prime illustration of the difference between selecting 
new economy industries based on growth rather than on high-tech employment, and suggests that the 
former may reveal more important differences in the employment relationship.   
Finally, recall that part of the reason for going from a classification of new economy jobs based on 
high-tech industries to one based on high-tech cities was to capture jobs that tend to surround high-tech 
industries.  One would certainly expect that the industries that are both high-growth and high-tech would be 
                                                 
30 Among workers in temporary help agencies (as measured in the CWS), personnel supply services is the most 
common industry (49 percent).  The next most common are health services n.e.c. (3 percent), construction (2 percent), 
and computer and data processing services (2 percent).   
As Segal and Sullivan explain, this industry includes temporary service employees, as well as employee 
leasing and employment agencies.  However, the trend in growth is very similar in an industry trade group series they 
present that focuses solely on temporary service employees, and temporary service employees represent nearly 90 
percent of workers in the personnel supply services industry.  12 
overrepresented in high-tech cities, since it is presumably the fast growth of high-tech industries that 
warrants the label for the city.  That this is the case is illustrated in the second column of Table 4.  This 
column shows that the 3 new economy industries based on the fastest growth (from Table 3) that are 
similarly classified based on high-tech employment (from Table 1) are over-represented in every high-tech 
city and, for half of the cities, over-represented by a factor of more than 1.5.  To better understand the 
nature of these high-tech cities, it is interesting to ask whether the other (17) high-growth industries in 
Table 3 also make up a disproportionately large share of employment in these cities.  As shown in the last 
column of Table 4, this is not the case; the employment shares of these industries in the high-tech cities are 
near the share in the comparison cities, and generally a bit lower.  This indicates that the selection of new 
economy industries based on growth seems to pick up many industries that are neither high-tech themselves 
nor particularly related to high-tech industries, which further reinforces the point that a growth-based new 
economy classification is in some ways fundamentally different from a technology-based one. 
III. Classifying the Employment Relationship 
  The Contingent Work Supplements (CWS) to the Current Population Survey provide a useful 
classification of the employment relationship that characterizes each worker’s job.  In particular, these 
supplements were designed with the express goal of measuring the shares of the workforce in a variety of 
non-traditional employment relationships, as well as, of course, to collect labor market information on these 
workers (Polivka, 1996).  The supplements focus on two types of non-traditional relationships–contingent 
work and alternative employment. 
To be defined as a contingent worker, two conditions must hold.
31  First, the individual must be in a 
job that is temporary, and in which an individual cannot work as long as he or she wishes.  Second, an 
attempt is made to distinguish jobs that are temporary by their nature, compared with jobs that might be 
temporarily held by a worker who expects to choose to leave (for example, a youth working in a 
“permanent” fast-food job, but only expecting to remain in it temporarily).  Only jobs of the first type are 
                                                 
31 Details on the classification of contingent and alternative employment are taken from Hipple (1998). 13 
considered contingent.
32  Within that broad definition, the BLS generally uses three definitions of 
contingent workers, going from more to less restrictive.  The most strict definition is wage and salary 
workers who expect their job to last 1 year or less and have been in the job 1 year or less.  The self-
employed and independent contractors are excluded.  Workers with temporary help agencies or contract 
companies are included if both 1-year criteria apply to their position with the temporary help agency or 
contract company.  The second definition adds in the self-employed and independent contractors for whom 
both 1-year criteria apply.  It also adds in workers with temporary help agencies or contract companies for 
whom both 1-year criteria apply to their current assignment.  Finally, the least restrictive definition drops 
the 1-year tenure criterion for wage and salary workers.   
The classification of workers in alternative employment arrangements is simpler, as this is simply a 
mutually exclusive classification by the following categories: independent contractors (including 
consultants and freelance workers, and irrespective of whether they identify themselves as wage and salary 
workers or self-employed); on-call workers; temporary help agency workers; and workers provided by 
contract firms.  Note that some of these workers may also be counted in some definitions of contingent 
workers.  Finally, with these definitions in hand, it is simple to classify workers dichotomously as either in 
any contingent/alternative arrangement, or a traditional (non-contingent/non-alternative) arrangement. 
The CWS files available for analysis are based on surveys conducted in February of 1995, 1997, 
1999, and 2001.  In the remainder of this section we present some descriptive statistics of contingent and 
alternative work arrangements, before turning to the main analysis, in the next section, of the relationship 
between these work arrangements and new economy jobs.  The first fact to point out is that at least over the 
short period captured by these four surveys, the proportions of workers in each type of employment 
arrangement were relatively stable.  These figures are reported in columns (1)-(4) of Table 5.
33  Looking, 
for example, at the broadest contingent work category, the percentage declines from 4.9 in 1995 to 4.0 in 
                                                 
32 Workers in temporary jobs respond that the job “could not last as long as they wish” and that they are “expecting 
their job to last a year or less for non-personal reasons.”    
33 Data were not allocated in the CWS files, and observations with missing data needed to classify workers by 
contingent or alternative status (and subcategories within these) were dropped. 14 
2001.  The percentage in any alternative arrangement was 9.8 in 1995 and 9.4 in 2001.
34  The percentage in 
a “catch-all” category of any contingent or alternative arrangement declined from 13.2 to 12.1 over the 
same period.  Certainly over this short period there is no sign of increased percentages of employment in 
contingent or alternative arrangements.
35   
The absence of an upward trend in contingent and alternative work has some bearing on one issue 
regarding the interpretation of the phrase “new economy,” discussed earlier.  In particular, we noted that 
some definitions of the new economy do not pertain to the types of jobs workers do, but rather pertain to 
more widespread changes in the economy, in which case our inquiry into the relationship between the 
employment relationship and new economy jobs might miss the mark.  The fact that employment 
relationships as captured in contingent and alternative work arrangements have not increased over the latter 
part of the 1990s suggests there was no major shift in employment relationships over time that might be 
associated with widespread changes in the economy.
36  However, because the CWS data are only available 
during the recent period of rapid economic growth, we cannot distinguish business-cycle effects from the 
longer-run time trend; while we do not see an increase in contingent and alternative work, this may be 
related to tight labor markets during economic growth and not the longer-run trend.  On the other hand, to 
the extent that the downturn had begun by February 2001, there appears to be no associated increase in 
contingent work and only a slight, statistically insignificant, increase in alternative work relative to 1999.  
Given the short period covered by the CWS and the similarity across these years in the prevalence of 
contingent and alternative work, we do not focus on changes over time in these employment arrangements, 
but focus instead on the cross-sectional relationship between employment in new economy jobs and the 
employment relationship, using the combined information from the pooled Contingent Work Supplements.  
                                                 
34 Despite the growth in the personnel supply services industry, there has not been growth in temporary help agency 
employment due to a decline in the use of temporary help agency workers in other industries. 
35 See also Cohany (1998) and U.S. Department of Labor (1999) which produce similar estimates by year (for the 
earlier years). 
36 For additional evidence on changes in the employment relationship more broadly defined, with a particular 
emphasis on job stability and job security, see the papers in Neumark (2000). 15 
Combining across the years of the CWS, the figures indicate that 4.4 percent of workers are 
employed in a contingent relationship, 9.6 percent in an alternative arrangement, and 12.6 percent in any 
contingent or alternative employment relationship, as shown in column (5).  Finally, the last two columns 
of the table report figures for two restricted versions of the sample.  In column (6) those workers not in 
school either full-time or part-time are dropped.  We believe it is potentially useful to isolate contingent and 
alternative work among non-students, as students may be likely to choose contingent work, in particular, as 
a result of their student status that may make both place of residence and type of work only temporary.  The 
descriptive statistics are consistent with this, as the incidence of each type of contingent work (although not 
alternative employment relationships) is lower among non-students.  Finally, column (7) further imposes an 
age restriction of 18-65 (inclusive), to abstract from very young workers sampling jobs while settling on a 
career, and older workers who may be pursuing short-term employment as part of partial retirement.  
Imposing this age restriction slightly reduces the incidence of contingent work and alternative work.  In the 
ensuing analysis we use the sample excluding those in school and focusing on prime-age workers 18 to 65 
(inclusive).
37   
The final rows of Table 5 report the share of workers in the combined category of “contingent or 
alternative” work by education level.  Workers with a Bachelor's degree or more education are more likely 
to be in contingent or alternative jobs compared to workers with a high school diploma or less education.  
For both sets of workers there was a decline in non-traditional work over the late 1990s.   
IV. The Employment Relationship among New Economy Workers 
  Having discussed the classification of new economy jobs, and of the employment relationship, we 
finally turn to the relationship between the two.  The empirical analysis we present is straightforward.  We 
first report differences in the incidence of contingent or alternative work in new economy jobs vs. other 
jobs, based on our three alternative classifications of new economy jobs.  We then allow for the possibility 
                                                 
37 Our focus is on contingent or alternative work arrangements.  However, another possible dimension of non-
traditional employment related to the new economy includes self-employment, as illustrated, perhaps, by the apparent 
increased prevalence of “start-ups” in the high-tech sector.  Thus, we also looked at self-employment in a parallel 
fashion to all of the analyses reported below.  To establish a baseline, self-employment rates in the CPS averaged just 
under 11 percent across the 1995-2001 CWS files, declining somewhat over the sample period. 16 
that individual characteristics such as age, sex, race, etc., are correlated with the likelihood that workers are 
in new economy jobs, as well as the likelihood that they are in contingent or alternative employment 
relationships, estimating linear probability models of the form:
38 
(1) CA = α + βNE + Xγ + ε  . 
In this generic regression, CA is a dummy variable for a particular contingent or alternative 
employment relationship, or a combined set of these.  NE is a dummy variable indicating that the individual 
is employed in a new economy job, based on one of our three classifications, and X is a vector of individual 
control variables, including: age; the square of age; a full set of dummy variables for educational 
attainment; a dummy variable for female; interactions of the female dummy variable with age and its 
square and the education dummy variables; a set of dummy variables for black, Hispanic, Asian, and other 
non-whites; and a dummy variable for foreign born.  The estimate of β therefore measures the shift 
associated with employment in a new economy job in the probability that a worker is in a particular 
contingent or alternative employment relationship, for workers otherwise identical in terms of the variables 
captured in X.  Finally, other controls are sometimes added that are intended to further probe the 
interpretation of the estimate of β; these are explained in describing the analysis for each of the three new 
economy classifications.   
New Economy Jobs Based on Employment in High-Technology Industries 
  Differences in the employment relationship in new economy jobs using a classification based on 
high-technology employment are reported in Table 6.  Columns (1) and (2) report the percentages in each 
type of employment relationship in new economy jobs based on this classification, and in other jobs, while 
column (3) reports the difference between the two.  For all three categories of contingent work, the 
percentage with contingent employment relationships is lower in new economy industries, by about .6 
percentage point using the two more restrictive contingent work measures, and .9 percentage point using 
                                                 
38 Due to the limited nature of the dependent variable in the linear probability model, we report boot-strapped standard 
errors based on 200 iterations.  Boot-strapped standard errors tend to be larger than White-corrected (i.e., robust) 
standard errors.  For the linear probability model, we prefer the boot-strapped standard errors to relax assumptions on 
the distribution of the residual terms.   17 
the broadest measure.  The results are a bit more varied for alternative employment relationships.  
Employment as an independent contractor or on-call worker is less prevalent in new economy industries 
(by 1.8 and 1.2 percentage points, respectively), while employment by a temporary help agency or contract 
firm is more prevalent (by .4 and 1.2 percentage points, respectively).  Overall, in new economy industries 
employment in alternative employment relationships is lower by 1.5 percentage points, and employment in 
any contingent or alternative relationship is lower by 2.5 percentage points.   
  In column (4), the individual-level control variables are added.  Generally speaking, these have 
little impact on the estimated differentials in the employment relationship between new economy industries 
and other industries.  The only sizable difference stems from the reduced relative incidence of employment 
as an independent contractor in new economy industries, which ultimately increases the overall shortfall of 
contingent or alternative employment in new economy industries to 3.3 percentage points. 
  The analysis in Table 6 is intended to focus on the intrinsic differences between industries based on 
a comparison of high-technology and other industries.  But the industries may differ along other 
dimensions as well.  We cannot, of course, include industry dummy variables to capture these other sources 
of differences, as our new economy classification is industry-based.  But it is important to control for other 
industry-related differences that might be strongly associated with contingent or alternative employment 
relationships.  The most natural one that raises concerns is industry growth.  High-technology industries are 
likely to be among the faster-growing industries in this sample period (as already illustrated in part by the 
overlap between Tables 1 and 3), and it is useful to parse out the independent association of contingent or 
alternative employment relationships with employment in high-tech industries.  Consequently, we add to 
the regression a variable measuring the growth of the industry’s share of employment; including this 
control is likely to, if anything, push the results in the direction of lower incidence of contingent or 
alternative work in new economy jobs.  In addition, we control for the overall size of the industry, as larger 
or smaller industries may differ in their use of non-traditional employment relationships.
39   
                                                 
39 Details on the construction of these control variables are given in the notes to Table 6.   18 
The results are reported in the fifth column of Table 6.  The estimates for contingent employment 
relationships are changed slightly, in the direction of lower relative prevalence among new economy jobs.  
The changes in the estimates for alternative arrangements are similarly modest and typically in the same 
direction.  The only substantive change, perhaps, is that the higher use of temporary help agency 
employment in new economy industries is no longer apparent in the data after including these industry 
growth and size controls.   
The final column of Table 6 limits our definition of new economy industries to those high-
technology industries that are also information-technology industries (see Table 1).
40  We find that 
contingent and alternative work overall is even less common in information-technology industries; looking 
at the separate categories, the sole exception is that contract firm employment is more common in 
information-technology industries. 
When the analysis is done by education level (final rows), with only the individual-level controls, 
the lower mean level of contingent or alternative work in high-tech industries is due to the lower level 
among workers with a high school diploma or less.  However, once we control for industry size and 
growth, high-tech employment is associated with a lower prevalence of non-traditional work for both 
highly-educated workers and less-educated workers, although more so for the latter group.
41   
Overall, then, there is virtually no evidence that employment relationships in new economy 
industries based on a high-technology classification are more likely to take non-traditional forms.  The only 
exception is contract firm employment, which is higher by about 1 to 2 percentage points in these 
industries.  Rather, in contrast to some of the claims and perceptions discussed in the introduction, most 
contingent or alternative employment relationships are less prevalent in new economy industries when 
defined by high-technology employment.  As a summary measure, the regression estimates with the full set 
of controls indicate that the percentage of workers in non-traditional employment relationships is 5.7 
                                                 
40 Workers in industries listed in Table 1 that are not information-technology industries are still included in the 
regression for column 6. 
41 For less-educated workers the regression has a dummy variable for less than a high school diploma.  For more-
educated workers the regression has a dummy variable for degree attainment beyond the Bachelor's.  Each education 
dummy variable is interacted with a dummy variable for female workers. 19 
percentage points lower in new economy industries than in other industries; relative to the sample mean of 
about 12.6 percent of the workforce in such arrangements, this implies that contingent or alternative 
employment relationships are 45 percent less prevalent in new economy industries.
42   
In order to understand the role of each new economy industry in driving the results in Table 6, we 
replaced the new economy industry dummy variable with a separate dummy variable for each of the 25 
new economy industries in Table 1 (regression not shown).
43  Compared to the aggregate of other or “old 
economy” industries, 7 of the 25 new economy industries had a higher rate of contingent work (under the 
broadest definition) but none these higher rates were statistically significant at the 10 percent level and for 
only one of these industries–manufacturing of office and accounting machines–was the estimated rate 
greater than 1 percentage point more than old economy industries.  For any alternative relationship, every 
new economy industry had a lower rate except for management and public relations services, where the rate 
was almost 22 percentage points higher than in old economy industries.  We found a similar result when we 
combined contingent or alternative work.  Every new economy industry except management and public 
relations services had a lower rate of contingent or alternative work than the aggregate of old economy 
industries, with the differences almost always statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level.  This 
indicates that the failure to find more use of contingent or alternative work arrangements among high-tech 
industries is not attributable to the inclusion of industries that use scientific personnel extensively but are 
not typically thought of as high-tech–such as paints, petroleum, or plastics.  Rather, even when looking at 
industries individually, those more typically associated with computers and information technology 
generally exhibit lower–not higher–use of contingent or alternative employment. 
New Economy Jobs Based on Residence in High-Technology Cities 
  This conclusion could differ, of course, using other definitions of new economy jobs.  Attention 
next turns to the definition based on high-tech cities.  Differences in the employment relationship in new 
economy jobs classified by high-technology cities are reported in Table 7.  As before, columns (1) and (2) 
                                                 
42 Paralleling these findings, the results also pointed to lower self-employment in high-tech industries, with a 
differential of 7.6 percentage points in the specification corresponding to column (5) of Table 6.  
43 The regression controls were the same as in the final column of Table 6. 20 
report the percentages in each employment relationship in new economy jobs based on this classification, 
and in other jobs, while column (3) reports the difference between the two.  In contrast to the results based 
on high-tech employment, for the classification based on high-tech cities almost all of these differences are 
in the direction of greater prevalence of contingent or alternative work in new economy jobs (with many of 
the differences statistically significant at the 5 percent level).  For the broadest definition of contingent 
work, the percentage with contingent employment relationships is higher in new economy cities, by about 
.7 percentage point.  Among alternative work arrangements, prevalence is higher in these cities for 
independent contractor, temporary help agency, and contract firm employment.  Overall, the prevalence of 
contingent or alternative employment relationships among workers in new economy cities is higher by 1 
percentage point.   
  Columns (4) and (5) report regression-adjusted estimates paralleling the same columns in Table 6.  
The individual-level controls in column (4) increase slightly the estimated differentials in contingent 
employment between new economy cities and other cities, and increase more sharply the estimated 
differential in alternative employment relationships.  As a summary measure, the relative incidence of 
contingent or alternative employment in new economy cities rises to 1.2 percentage points.  Column (5) 
adds controls for city size and growth, paralleling the industry-level controls in Table 6, with the same 
motivation of isolating the intrinsic nature of employment in these cities, aside from the possibility that 
employment relationships differ in larger versus smaller cities, or because of recent growth.  Adding these 
controls raises slightly the relatively higher incidence of contingent work, with the opposite effect 
regarding alternative work, on net restoring a differential of 1 percentage point higher incidence of 
contingent or alternative work in high-tech cities. 
  For workers with a high school diploma or less education, residence in high-tech cities is not 
associated with a higher prevalence of contingent or alternative work (final rows of Table 7).  Rather, the 
high-tech city results are mainly due to the higher prevalence of non-traditional work for workers with a 
college degree compared to similar workers in other places. 21 
To summarize, employment in high-tech cities, which is one of our methods of delineating new 
economy jobs, does appear to be characterized by a higher prevalence of contingent and alternative 
employment, at least for workers with a Bachelor's degree or more education.  Based on the regression 
estimates in column (5), contingent employment is higher by .9 percentage point and alternative 
employment is higher by .4 percentage point.  While these are not large differences in absolute terms, the 
first is sizable in relative terms, representing 25 percent higher prevalence of contingent work.  Overall, in 
the combined category of contingent or alternative work, workers with a Bachelor's degree or more 
education have a 10 percent higher prevalence.
44  These findings contrast rather sharply with those for new 
economy jobs based on employment in high-tech industries.  After reporting the high-growth industry 
results, we explore the role of the industrial mix in high-tech cities, to better understand what drives the 
high-tech city results. 
New Economy Jobs Based on Employment in High-Growth Industries 
Finally, we turn to the third definition of new economy jobs, based simply on employment in the 
fastest-growing industries.  As Table 3 indicated, some of the fastest-growing industries are high-tech, but 
by no means all of them.  The results for this definition, reported in Table 8, indicate that new economy 
jobs are much more likely to use contingent or alternative employment relationships.  Looking at columns 
(1)-(3), every category of contingent or alternative work is significantly more prevalent in the fastest-
growing industries.  For the broadest contingent work definition, prevalence among the fastest-growing 
industries is higher by 2.2 percentage points.  The corresponding number for alternative employment 
relationships is 8.0 percentage points, and for the overall contingent/alternative measure 8.3 percentage 
points.  The differences remain virtually unchanged when the individual-level regression controls are added 
in column (4).   
In the previous two tables, controls were added for size and growth, to try to capture other features 
of industries (Table 6) or cities (Table 7).  Of course, in this table we are focusing on growth per se, so it 
                                                 
44 On the other hand, self-employment is no more prevalent in these cities, with corresponding specifications 
indicating if anything lower prevalence (not statistically significant) once all of the controls are added.   22 
would be nonsensical to control for industry growth.  However, column (5) does add a control for industry 
size, which leads to slight decreases in the estimated differentials for broadly-defined contingent 
employment and slight increases for any alternative employment.  For the summary measure combining 
both of these, the estimated prevalence in the fastest-growing industries is higher by 8.0 percentage points, 
or more than 60 percent higher relative to the mean prevalence. 
The most important high-growth industry for explaining the higher rates of contingent and 
alternative work is construction.  Among the 20 new economy industries defined by fast growth, 
construction has the largest share of workers at almost 22 percent.  Construction also has a high level of 
contingent work (6.5 percent using the broadest definition), alternative work (28 percent), and combined 
contingent or alternative work (32 percent).  The second most important industry is personnel supply 
services.  Although personnel supply services has very high rates of contingent work (45 percent), 
alternative work (69 percent), and combined contingent or alternative work (71 percent), the importance of 
this industry is limited by its small share of workers–less than 3 percent.
45 
To get a better idea of how the employment relationship in new economy jobs based on industry 
growth differs aside from the influence of these two rather idiosyncratic industries, in column (6) of Table 
8 two dummy variables are added for employment in construction and personnel supply services.  As 
expected, this sharply reduces the higher prevalence of temporary help agency employment.  
Correspondingly, it reduces the estimated differential for any alternative employment arrangement from 8.4 
percentage points to 4.1 percentage points.  Finally, because much of the employment in these two 
industries is contingent, the estimated differential for contingent work falls from 2.0 to .2 percentage points, 
and the differential prevalence for any contingent or alternative arrangement falls to 3.7 percentage points, 
or 30 percent relative to the mean.  Thus, while eliminating consideration of construction and the personnel 
supply services industry reduces the extent by which new economy jobs appear to rely on contingent and 
alternative employment relationships, the fact still remains that new economy jobs–based on industry 
                                                 
45 The questions used to identify workers in temporary help agencies are constructed to attempt to exclude regular 
employees of temporary help agencies, i.e., those who run or staff the agencies.  Thus, the percentage of workers in 
the personnel supply services industry who are classified as “temps” can be well under 100.   23 
employment growth–do rely substantially more on non-traditional and in particular alternative employment 
relationships.
46  We also find strong results for growth industries for both highly- and less-educated 
workers (final rows). 
Of course, it is possible that growth, per se, contributes to the reliance on contingent and alternative 
workers as fast-growing industries may be more likely to use non-traditional employment relationships.  
High-growth industries may be experiencing what managers perceive to be a temporary increase in 
workload and thus there may be a preference for temporary and contingent workers.  Furthermore, high-
growth industries have a large proportion of new hires who may be employed on a contingent basis to 
allow firms to screen workers before offering a regular position.
47  In light of these considerations, we 
might expect that with the exception of a few particular industries such as construction and personnel 
supply services, high rates of contingent and alternative work in these growth industries will decline when 
the growth abates.   
The Industrial Mix of Employment in High-Tech Cities 
Finally, we report results from analyses intended to probe the higher incidence of contingent or 
alternative employment in high-tech cities–in particular, trying to understand whether the industrial mix of 
employment in these cities underlies this higher incidence.  First, as we showed in Table 4, industries that 
are both high-tech and fast-growing are overrepresented in high-tech cities.  Since high-tech employment is 
not associated with more contingent and alternative employment relationships, the overrepresentation of 
high-tech industries alone cannot explain the higher prevalence of such employment relationships in high-
tech cities.  However, this higher prevalence could be attributable to the overrepresentation of faster-
growing industries, given the substantial differentials reported in Table 8.  To assess this question, in Table 
9 we add controls for industry size and industry growth (for each worker’s industry) to the high-tech city 
                                                 
46 Paralleling these findings, self-employment is considerably more prevalent in the fast-growing industries, with 
differentials between 3 and 4 percentage points in specifications corresponding to columns (5) and (6) in Table 8. 
47 Houseman and Polivka (2000) report that the main motivation for using alternative employment relationships (in 
which they include part-time employment) is to handle fluctuations in the workload or regular staff.  They also 
provide evidence that, to a lesser extent, employers use alternative employment relationships to screen workers.  We 
have no clear way to capture this at the industry level, but it may be strongly related to industry growth.   24 
regressions (column (2)).  This has little impact on the estimated differentials in contingent employment 
relationships between high-tech and other cities (compare with column (1), which repeats column (5) of 
Table 7).  However, with controls for industry size and growth, the high-tech cities no longer have a 
significantly higher share of contract firm employment and the higher share of temporary help agency 
employment is also reduced, with the result that the importance of high-tech cities for any alternative 
employment is no longer statistically significant.  Looking at the combined category of contingent or 
alternative work, the coefficient falls from 1.00 to .67 suggesting that roughly one-third of the higher 
incidence of contingent and alternative employment in high-tech cities is due to the size and growth of the 
industries in high-tech cities. 
To explore this further, we control for the entire industrial mix in high-tech cities by adding 
dummy variables for each three-digit industry.  The estimates remain essentially unchanged from those that 
control for industry size and growth (column (3)).  The full regression results (not shown) reveal that three 
of the most important industries for explaining the higher prevalence of contingent and alternative work in 
high-tech cities are the three high-tech industries that are also high-growth industries (shown in bold in 
Table 3).  When we add indicators for each of these three industries, the results are very similar to the 
results controlling individually for every industry (compare column (4) with column (3)).  As before, we 
find that the high-tech city results hold for workers with a Bachelor's degree or more, but not for workers 
with a high school diploma or less education (final rows). 
Thus, we conclude that the prevalence of high-tech and fast-growing industries in high-tech cities 
explains roughly one-third of the higher prevalence of contingent or alternative work in those cities.  The 
remaining two-thirds of the higher prevalence appears to be explained by a distinction captured by our new 
economy classification based on high-tech cities that differs from those based on employment growth by 
industry and employment in high-tech industries.  Thus, high-tech cities appear to capture another 
dimension of new economy jobs that utilize contingent and alternative employment relationships at a 
greater rate than do other jobs. 25 
V. Conclusion and Discussion 
The primary goal of this paper is to examine whether new economy jobs are less likely to use 
traditional employment relationships, and more likely to rely on “alternative” or “contingent” work.  Data 
on contingent and alternative employment are readily available, based on recent micro-level surveys 
devoted to measuring employment in these types of arrangements.  On the other hand, the phrase “new 
economy” has been used in so many ways (not all of them related to classifications of jobs) that there is, in 
a sense, an independent research project required to distinguish new economy jobs from other jobs.  We do 
not claim to have the definitive method of so classifying jobs, and indeed we do not believe there is one 
unique classification.  Instead, we develop and use three alternative classification schemes that seem like 
plausible candidates consistent with what we see as the main conceptions of the new economy based on the 
world of work: one based on employment in high-tech industries; a second based on residence (and 
employment) in high-tech cities; and a third based, more mechanically, on employment in fast-growing 
industries, which tend to be service industries. 
Somewhat surprisingly, at least given some popular perceptions of the new economy, when we 
look at new economy jobs classified on the basis of employment in high-tech industries, we do not find 
greater use of contingent or alternative employment relationships.  In fact, these types of employment 
relationships are somewhat less prevalent in high-tech industries with the exception of management and 
public relations services.  However, when we classify new economy workers based on residence in high-
tech cities, contingent and alternative employment relationships are more common, even after accounting 
for the faster employment growth in these cities.  These differentials are in part attributable to the overall 
industrial mix of employment in these cities, although this extends beyond employment in the typical 
“high-tech” industries.  Combining all contingent and alternative categories, workers in new economy jobs 
classified in this way are 8 percent more likely to be in contingent or alternative employment arrangements.  
Defining “new economy” more literally to be those industries with the fastest growth yields the most 
striking differences, as workers in the 20 fastest-growing industries are more than 60 percent more likely to 
be in contingent or alternative employment relationships, although a large chunk of this difference is driven 26 
by employment in the fast-growing construction and personnel supply services industries where 
employment is perhaps “intrinsically” contingent or alternative.   
Of course, the numbers are only suggestive, as–even under the most favorable view of our means 
of identifying new economy jobs–we do not have a rigid sorting of workers into new economy jobs and 
other jobs, but rather into groups of workers in which new economy jobs are more and less prevalent.  This 
suggests that the “true” differential between new economy jobs and other jobs could be considerably larger.  
While the exact magnitudes of the differentials are therefore uncertain, the data nonetheless indicate 
significantly greater use of contingent and alternative employment relationships in new economy jobs when 
these jobs are defined by employment in high-tech cities, and what would have to be considered large 
differences between new economy jobs and other jobs when new economy jobs are defined by employment 
in fast-growing industries.   
To the extent that the personnel supply services industry is a feature of the new economy, and 
continues its rapid growth, it will contribute an increasing share of contingent employment.  Furthermore, it 
has clearly grown into a non-trivial industry, exceeding 2 percent of total employment in the late 1990s 
(Houseman and Polivka, 2000), and although the industry cannot indefinitely continue its past growth rate 
of 11 percent per year from 1972 to 1995 (Segal and Sullivan, 1997), it clearly has the potential to partially 
drive aggregate trends in contingent and alternative employment relationships.
48  Nonetheless, based on the 
evidence we present, there appears to be a general link between the new economy and greater reliance on 
contingent or alternative employment relationships, and not solely growing contingent and alternative 
employment stemming from the emergence and rapid growth of the personnel supply services industry. 
Our findings, of course, do not speak to the general notion of the relationship between the new 
economy and contingent or alternative employment.  Rather, they speak only to the relationship based on 
                                                 
48 For example, if the rate of contingent employment is 45 percent in this industry (as reported earlier) vs. 3 percent in 
all other industries, and employment in this industry grows from 2 to 4 percent of total employment, then the 
prevalence of contingent employment in the economy would rise from 3.8 percent to 4.7 percent.  However, note that 
despite the relatively rapid growth of employment in the personnel supply services industry in the latter part of the 
1990’s (although still relative to a small base), Table 5 showed no growth over this period in the share of the 
workforce working for temporary help agencies or in the share of the workforce classified as contingent.  27 
our classifications of new economy jobs.  As such, what do the findings imply?  Does the development of 
the new economy presage the erosion of the traditional employment relationship?  Employment in high-
technology industries, per se, is not associated with less reliance on the traditional employment 
relationship.  However, one of the motivations for looking at high-tech cities was to capture employment in 
the jobs that more typically grow up and develop around these high-tech industries, and the greater use of 
contingent and alternative employment in high-tech cities indicates that such employment is less likely to 
use the traditional relationship.  To the extent that the high-tech city classification of new economy jobs 
focuses on jobs that do not rely on high-tech employment per se, but rather jobs that are intertwined with 
high-tech industries, the experiences of workers in high-tech cities may provide us with some basis for 
predicting what will happen as the economy as a whole moves in the directions experienced first in these 
cities (assuming this occurs).  Looking at the data this way provides a basis for expecting some erosion of 
traditional employment relationships, although not dramatic changes.   
But in terms of predicting future changes in the employment relationship, there is some intuitive 
appeal to getting away from a priori classifications of industries or cities, and simply looking at the fastest-
growing industries, as these industries are most likely to represent a growing share of employment and 
hence, in the most literal sense, to develop into the new economy.  The analysis of new economy jobs 
based on industry employment growth does point more strongly to erosion of traditional employment 
relationships.  Of course to some extent growth, per se, may be the prime determinant of reliance on 
contingent or alternative employment, rather than something intrinsic about the growing industries.  Thus, 
as these industries mature and presumably experience slowing growth, reliance on contingent and 
alternative employment may fall.  In addition, it is conceivable that at the end of a very long expansion in 
the late 1990s, perhaps due to an expectation that growth must eventually slow, relatively more new hiring 
may have been done on a contingent basis.  These are questions that cannot be answered from the available 
data.  In this regard, though, the important contribution played by the personnel supply services industry is 
informative, as this industry is intrinsically based on contingent and alternative work.  It is only a matter of 
conjecture, of course, as to how large this industry can grow, but its apparently inevitable larger share in the 28 
U.S. economy does presage a possibly significant and long-lasting increase in contingent and alternative 
employment relationships.   
  It is important to emphasize the provisional nature of these conclusions, however.  The plethora of 
meanings of the phrase “new economy,” as well as the difficulty of operationalizing particular meanings of 
the phrase, imply that researchers are likely to come up with a multitude of different ways of measuring the 
new economy, and any of these are likely to have some subjective component.  We have tried to focus on 
objective criteria for classifying new economy jobs, when possible based on studies done prior to this one.  
But we strongly suspect that a few years down the road numerous other studies will propose and consider 
different ways of classifying new economy jobs, and the answers one gets to questions about employment 
relationships in the new economy may depend on how these jobs are classified.  Thus, this paper may 
ultimately serve more to raise these questions and stimulate research on this topic than to provide definitive 
answers. 29 
References 
Albrecht, Karl, and Ron Zemke. 1985. Service America! Doing Business in the New Economy (Homewood, 
Illinois: Dow Jones-Erwin). 
 
Autor, David H., Lawrence F. Katz, and Alan B. Krueger. 1998. “Computing Inequality: Have Computers 
Changed the Labor Market?” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 113, No. 4, November, pp. 1169-213.  
 
Bahr, Morton. 2000. Remarks to the Communications Workers of America 62
nd Convention. 
 
Barley, Stephen R. 1996. “Technicians in the Workplace: Ethnographic Evidence for Bringing Work into 
Organization Studies.” Administrative Sciences Quarterly, Vol. 41, pp. 404-41. 
 
Bartel, Ann P., and Frank R. Lichtenberg. 1987. “The Comparative Advantage of Educated Workers in 
Implementing New Technology.” Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 69, No. 1, February, pp. 1-11. 
  
Batt, Rosemary. 1999. “Work Organization, Technology, and Performance in Customer Service and Sales.” 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 52, No. 4, July, pp. 539-61. 
 
Black, Sandra E., and Lisa M. Lynch. 2000. “What’s Driving the New Economy: The Benefits of Workplace 
Innovation.” NBER Working Paper No. 7479, January. 
 
Bond, Stephen R., and Jason G. Cummins. 2000. “The Stock Market and Investment in the New Economy: 
Some Tangible Facts and Intangible Fictions.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, No. 1, pp. 61-108.  
 
Boslett, Mark. 2000. “Showdown at Verizon.” The Standard, August 4. 
 
Bresnahan, Timothy F., Erik Brynjolfsson, and Lorin M. Hitt. 1999. “Information Technology, Workplace 
Organization and the Demand for Skilled Labor: Firm-level Evidence.” NBER Working Paper No. 7136, May. 
 
Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD. 2001. “ ‘Firms, Workers and the Changing 
Workplace’: Considerations for the Old and the New Economy.” BIAC Discussion Paper, February 23.   
 
Cohany, Sharon R. 1998. “Workers in Alternative Employment Arrangements: A Second Look.” Monthly 
Labor Review, November, pp. 3-21. 
 
Cortright, Joseph, and Heike Mayer. 2001. High-tech Specialization: A Comparison of High-technology 
Centers, The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, Survey Series. 
 
D’Andrea Tyson, Laura. 2001. “Why the New Economy is Here to Stay.” BusinessWeek Online, April 30. 
 
DeLong, J. Bradford, and Lawrence H. Summers. 2001. “The “New Economy”: Background, Historical 
Perspective, Questions, and Speculations.” In Economic Policy for the Information Economy (Kansas City: 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City), pp. 11-46. 
 
DeVol, Ross. 1999. America’s High-Tech Economy, Milken Institute, Santa Monica, CA.   
 
Giarini, Orio, ed. 1987. The Emerging Service Economy (Oxford: Pergamon Press). 
 
Ginzberg, Eli. 1984. “The Service Economy and the Changing Job Structures.” In Robert A. Ullrich, ed. The 
American Work Force: Labor and Employment in the 1980s (Dover, MA: Auburn House), pp. 81-94. 30 
 
Gordon, Robert J. 2000. “Does the “New Economy” Measure up to the Great Inventions of the Past?” NBER 
Working Paper No. 7833, August. 
 
Hecker, Daniel. 1999. “High-Technology Employment: A Broader View.” Monthly Labor Review, June, pp. 18-
28. 
 
Hipple, Steven. 1998. “Contingent Work: Results from the Second Survey.” Monthly Labor Review, November, 
pp. 22-35. 
 
Houseman, Susan N., and Anne E. Polivka. 2000. “The Implications of Flexible Staffing Arrangements for Job 
Stability.” In David Neumark, ed. On the Job: Is Long-Term Employment a Thing of the Past? (NY: Russell 
Sage Foundation), pp. 427-62. 
 
Inman, Robert P., ed. 1985. Managing the Service Economy: Prospects and Problems (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press). 
 
Mandel, Michael J. 1999. “The Prosperity Gap.” BusinessWeek Online, September 27. 
 
Miller, Rich. 2001. “The New Economy Lives On.” BusinessWeek Online, May 10. 
 
Neumark, David, ed. 2000. On the Job: Is Long-Term Employment a Thing of the Past? (NY: Russell Sage 
Foundation). 
 
Neumark, David, Daniel Polsky, and Daniel Hansen. 1999. “Has Job Stability Declined Yet? New Evidence for 
the 1990s.” Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 17, No. 4, Pt. 2, October, pp. S29-64. 
 
Paton, Dean. 1999. “Seattle’s Rise as the Capital of the New Economy.” Christian Science Monitor, November 
30. 
 
Polivka, Anne E. 1996. ”Contingent and Alternative Work Arrangements, Defined.” Monthly Labor Review, 
October, pp. 3-9.  
 
Progressive Policy Institute. 2001. The Metropolitan New Economy Index, Washington, DC. 
 
Reich, Robert. 2001. The Future of Success (New York: Alfred A. Knopf). 
 
Schiffrin, Anya. 2000. “What’s So New About the New Economy?” The Standard, November 6. 
  
Segal, Lewis M., and Daniel G. Sullivan. 1997. “The Growth of Temporary Services Work.” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, Vol. 11, No. 2, Spring, pp. 117-36. 
 
Shepard, Stephen B. 1997. “The New Economy: What It Really Means.” BusinessWeek Online, November 17. 
 
Sunnucks, Mike. 2001. “As Pittsburgh Builds its High-Tech Sector, Past Plays a Role in its Future.” Pittsburgh 
Business Times, January 5.  
 
Triplett, Michael. 2000. “Protecting Yourself in The Dot-Com Job Market.” Gfn.com, The Gay Financial 
Network, July 31. 
 
U.S. Department of Commerce. 1999. “The Emerging Digital Economy II.” June.  31 
 
U.S. Department of Commerce. 2000. “Service Industries–New Economy’s Biggest Generator of Jobs; 
Mississippi Leads States, Census Bureau Reports.” June 29.  
 
U.S. Department of Labor. 1999. “Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, February 1999.” 
December 21.  
 
Valletta, Robert G. 1999. “Declining Job Security.” Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 17, No. 4, Pt. 2, October, 
pp. S170-97. 
 
Varian, Hal J. 2001. “High-Technology Industries and Market Structure.” In Economic Policy for the 
Information Economy (Kansas City: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City), pp. 65-102. 
 32 
 
Table 1: New Economy Industries Based on Technological and 





Agricultural chemicals   
Aircraft and parts   
Computer and data processing services  Yes 
Computers and related equipment  Yes 
Construction and material handling machines   
Drugs  
Electrical machinery, equipment, and supplies, 
n.e.c. 
 
Engineering, architectural, and surveying 
services 
 
Engines and turbines   
Guided missiles, space vehicles, and parts   
Industrial and miscellaneous chemicals   
Machinery, except electrical, n.e.c.   
Management and public relations services   
Medical, dental, & optical instruments and 
supplies 
Yes 
Motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment   
Office and accounting machines  Yes 
Ordnance  
Paints, varnishes, and related products   
Petroleum refining   
Photographic equipment and supplies  Yes 
Plastics, synthetics, and resins   
Radio, T.V., and communication equipment  Yes 
Research, development, and testing services   
Scientific and controlling instruments  Yes 
Soaps and cosmetics   
Source: Hecker (1999).  The Hecker study lists 29 industries based 
on SIC codes.  As the CPS data we analyze use Census industry 
codes, we used a cross-walk between SIC and Census industry 
codes, resulting in the 25 Census industries shown here.  The 
information-technology industries are based on U.S. Department of 
Commerce (1999).
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Table 2: Top 10 New Economy Cities Based on High-Technology Employment 
 
City 
Share of employment (%) in 
high-technology industry 
San Jose, CA PMSA  36.42 
Austin-San Marcos, TX MSA  21.49 
Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, NC MSA  16.53 
Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV PMSA  13.45 
Boston, MA-NH PMSA  14.81 
Portland-Vancouver, OR-WA PMSA  13.98 
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA PMSA  16.22 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI MSA  14.17 
Phoenix-Mesa, AZ MSA  11.00 
San Diego, CA MSA  14.64 
Other large cities  10.21 
Source: The list of cities comes from Cortright and Mayer (2001, Table 3).  The cities 
are ranked from top to bottom based on the study’s total high-tech employment 
“location quotient.”  The shares in the second column are for employment in the 25 
industries listed in Table 1.  They are computed (using sample weights) from the 
CWS 1997, 1999, and 2001 files; the 1995 supplement is not used because it does not 
have city codes.  The last row includes the 51 additional cities with more than 
500,000 workers on average over the 1996-2000 period.  
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Table 3: Top 20 New Economy Industries Based on Growth, Ranked 
 
Industry 
Growth in employment 
share, 1996 to 2000 
Computer and data processing 
services  .806 
Construction .659 
Elementary and secondary schools  .277 
Telephone communications  .186 
Security, commodity brokerage, and 
investment companies  .170 
Personnel supply services  .151 
Management and public relations 
services  .146 
Child day care services  .130 
Credit agencies, n.e.c.  .129 
Trucking Services  .124 
Engineering, architectural, and 
surveying services  .112 
Business services, n.e.c.  .088 
Professional and commercial equipment 
and supplies  .085 
Lumber and building material retailing  .078 
Drug stores  .069 
Offices and clinics of physicians  .065 
Health services, n.e.c.  .061 
Miscellaneous entertainment and 
recreation services  .058 
Miscellaneous retail stores  .056 
Air transportation  .049 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on CPS ORG files, weighted 
estimates.  Calculation described in text.  Industries that also appear 
in Table 1 are highlighted in boldface.  The second column shows 
the growth in the employment shares between the 1996 and 2000 
ORG files (annual averages).  
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Share of employment (%) in 
high-tech and high-growth 
industries  
Share of employment (%) in 
high-growth industries, but not 
high-tech industries 
San Jose, CA PMSA  9.65  19.29 
Austin-San Marcos, TX MSA  6.86  22.56 
Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, NC MSA  4.42  25.56 
Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV PMSA  9.29  23.98 
Boston, MA-NH PMSA  6.86  24.91 
Portland-Vancouver, OR-WA PMSA  4.58  26.95 
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA PMSA  5.64  21.75 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI MSA  5.24  25.78 
Phoenix-Mesa, AZ MSA  3.84  29.71 
San Diego, CA MSA  5.11  26.62 
Other large cities  3.56  27.55 
Source: Authors’ calculations, weighted estimates.  See notes to Tables 1-3.  The second column refers to the 
boldfaced industries in Table 3 (those which also appear in Table 1), while the third column refers to the remaining 
industries in Table 3.  The shares are computed from the CWS 1997, 1999, and 2001 files.  
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics on Contingent and Alternative Employment   













Not in school, 
age 18-65 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6)  (7) 
Contingent work            










































            
Alternative work            






































































            
Contingent or alternative            














     By education            
































Sample size  57,146 51,161 51,541  38,116 197,964  186,505  180,908 
Source: Authors’ calculations, CWS 1995, 1997, 1999, and 2001, weighted estimates.  Percentages are reported, 
with standard errors of means in parentheses.  Work may be classified as both contingent and alternative, so the 
“contingent or alternative” row (for the full sample) is typically less than the sum of the two categories.  
Observations are limited to employed civilians aged 18-65, excluding unpaid family members.  For the H.S. 
diploma or less sample, the sample size in column (7) is 76,389.  For the Bachelor's or more sample, the sample size 
in column (7) is 53,069.  Non-respondents to the supplements were dropped.  Individuals in school are defined as 
those in school either part-time or full-time.  
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Table 6: Contingent and Alternative Employment: New Economy Workers Based on Employment in High-Tech Industries  













Add controls for 




classified as high-tech 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
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Contingent or 
alternative 
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Source: Authors’ calculations, CWS 1995, 1997, 1999, and 2001, weighted estimates.  Observations are limited to employed 
civilians aged 18-65, excluding unpaid family members.  The sample size is 180,908 for the full sample, 76,389 for the H.S. 
diploma or less sample, and 53,069 for the Bachelor's or more sample.  Columns (1)-(3) report percentages, with standard 
errors of means (difference in means in column (3)) in parentheses.  Columns (4)-(6) report regression-adjusted estimates of 
the difference in column (3), based on a linear probability model for employment in the indicated category, including a 
dummy variable for new economy industries, and other control variables.  The individual controls are described in the text.  
In column (5), the added controls are: the number of workers in the industry averaged over 1996-2000 ORG files; and the 
change in the industry employment share from 1996 to 2000 (using annual averages from the ORG files).  In column (6) the 
controls are the same as column (5) but the list of new economy industries is restricted to information technology industries 
(as shown in Table 1).  Boot-strapped standard errors are reported in parentheses in columns (4), (5), and (6).  See notes to 
Tables 1 and 5 for additional details.   
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Table 7: Contingent and Alternative Employment: New Economy Workers Based on Residence in 
High-Technology Cities  













Add controls for 
city size and 
growth 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
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Source: Authors’ calculations from the CWS 1997, 1999, and 2001, weighted estimates; the 1995 
supplement is not used because it does not have city codes.  Observations are limited to employed 
civilians aged 18-65, excluding unpaid family members.  The sample size is 128,556 for the full 
sample, 53,861 for the H.S. diploma or less sample, and 38,187 for the Bachelor's or more sample.  
Columns (1)-(3) report percentages, with standard errors of means (difference in means in column 
(3)) in parentheses.  Columns (4)-(6) report regression-adjusted estimates of the difference in column 
(3), based on a linear probability model for employment in the indicated category, including a dummy 
variable for new economy industries, and other control variables.  See text for individual controls.  In 
column (5), the added controls are: the number of workers in the city averaged over 1996-2000 ORG 
files; the change in the city employment share from 1996 to 2000 (using annual averages from the 
ORG files), and an indicator for non-city (but within-MSA) residence.  Boot-strapped standard errors 
are reported in parentheses in columns (4) and (5).  See notes to Tables 2, 5, and 6 for additional 
details.  
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Table 8: Contingent and Alternative Employment: New Economy Workers Based on Employment in High-Growth 
Industries  
  Means Regression-adjusted  estimates 
























  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
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Source: Authors’ calculations from CWS 1995, 1997, 1999, and 2001, weighted estimates.  Observations are limited to 
employed civilians aged 18-65, excluding unpaid family members.  The sample size is 180,908 for the full sample, 76,389 
for the H.S. diploma or less sample, and 53,069 for the Bachelor's or more sample.  Columns (1)-(3) report percentages, 
with standard errors of means (difference in means in column (3)) in parentheses.  Columns (4)-(5) report regression-
adjusted estimates of the difference in column (3), based on a linear probability model for employment in the indicated 
category, including a dummy variable for new economy industries, and other control variables.  See text for individual 
controls.  In column (5), the added control is the number of workers in the industry averaged over 1996-2000 ORG files.  
Column (6) adds a dummy variable for employment in construction and a dummy variable for employment in the 
temporary help services industry.  Boot-strapped standard errors are reported in parentheses in columns (4)-(6).  See notes 
to Tables 3, 5, and 6 for additional details.  
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Table 9: Contingent and Alternative Employment: New Economy Workers Based on Residence in High-
Technology Cities, Additional Specifications  
Regression-adjusted estimates   
Controls for 
city size and 
growth 
Add controls for 





Add dummies for three 
high-tech, fast growth 
industries 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
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Contingent or 
alternative 
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Source: Authors’ calculations from CWS 1997, 1999, and 2001, weighted estimates; the 1995 supplement is 
not used because it does not have city codes.  Observations are limited to employed civilians aged 18-65, 
excluding unpaid family members.  The sample size is 128,556 for the full sample, 53,861 for the H.S. 
diploma or less sample, and 38,187 for the Bachelor's or more sample.  Columns (1)-(4) report regression-
adjusted estimates based on a linear probability model for employment in the indicated category, including 
a dummy variable for high-technology cities and other control variables.  See text for individual controls.  
Column (1) repeats column (5) from Table 7.  Column (2) adds industry size and growth controls (as in 
Table 6).  Column (3) has a dummy variable for each three-digit industry.  Column (4) has a dummy 
variable for each high-tech, high-growth industry (shown in bold in Table 3).  Boot-strapped standard errors 
are reported in parentheses.  See notes to Tables 7 for additional details.   
 
 